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1. Introduction
Late on the night of Friday June 1, 2001, Saeed Hotary left 
the Palestinian West Bank city of Kalkilya by car. Two 
colleagues, who also made the journey, dropped him off 
at the promenade in Tel Aviv. According to eyewitness 
reports, Hotary joined a long queue of people awaiting 
entry into the Dolphinarium nightclub. He mingled with 
some of the teenagers in the queue and flirted with one 
girl in particular. Without warning, Hotary detonated 
an explosive device strapped to his body, which held a 
large number of metal objects including ball bearings 
and screws. Within an instant, both Hotary and the girl 
evaporated. In total, twenty-one people died and one 
hundred and twenty were injured, the vast majority of 
whom were teenagers gathering on Tel Aviv’s promenade 
to socialize at the weekend (O’Reilly 2001).
Condemnation from world leaders followed the next day. 
Despite that, Palestinian terrorist organizations competed 
for claims of responsibility. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the 
little known Palestinian Hezbollah claimed the bomber 
as their own (MIPT Database). Dozens of Palestinians 
in Ramallah reportedly celebrated the act. Hotary’s 
family and neighbors also celebrated. His father stated 
he wished he had twenty more sons to become suicide 
bombers (Khalaf 2001). His neighbors hung pictures of 
the new martyr holding seven sticks of dynamite around 
the neighborhood and arranged flowers in the shapes of 
a heart and a bomb to display. His picture adorned an el-
ementary school entrance in his hometown (Kelley 2001). 
Two weeks later, an opinion poll showed 68.6 percent sup-
port for suicide bombings amongst a sample of over one 
thousand Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (JMCC 
Poll no. 41). In a separate poll 82.3 percent of respondents 
did not view this incident as an act of terrorism (PCPSR 
Poll no. 3).
Many questions arise from this story. Why would an 
otherwise normal twenty-one-year-old electrician blow 
himself up? Why do terrorist organizations use this 
tactic? Is the death of the perpetrator instrumental to the 
success of the act? What role do the bomber’s colleagues 
play in the facilitation of suicide bombing? Why do 
terrorist organizations compete to claim such a violent 
attack against innocents? How can a suicide bombing 
and actors involved receive such levels of support from 
the wider community? 
These questions have become more important over the 
last few years. The Iraqi insurgency has produced more 
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suicide bombings than the previous twenty-five years.1 
Between 1980 and 2004, suicide bombings accounted for 
48 percent of all deaths through terrorism despite its use in 
only 3 percent of incidents (Pape 2005).2 Sustained suicide 
bombings occurred in various Lebanese groups’ campaigns 
to drive American, French, and Israeli forces out of Leba-
non, attempts by various Palestinian groups to coerce Israel 
into leaving Gaza and the West Bank, the Tamil, Chechen, 
Kashmiri, and Kurdish separatist movements, al Qaeda’s 
sustained efforts against the United States and its allies, 
and the Iraqi and Afghan insurgencies. Suicide bombers 
have also emerged from Britain, Belgium, Somalia, Mali, 
Iran, Syria, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Sudan, Saudi 
Arabia , the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan.
Figure 1: Number of suicide bombing by year
Current research on terrorism in general, and suicide 
bombing in particular typically focuses on one of three 
possible dimensions; the terrorist/suicide bomber, the 
terrorist organization and to a lesser extent, the com-
munity from which suicide bombings emerge. Studies on 
individual terrorists and suicide bombers seek to ascer-
tain factors driving individuals to engage in terrorism. 
Various analyses have focused on pathological disposition 
to violence (Gordon 2002; Post 1990), an authoritarian 
personality (Lester, Yang, and Lindsay 2004), general 
socialization factors (Atran, 2003; Post 2005; Sageman 
2005; Silke 2003), altruism (Azam 2005), rational choice 
(Gupta 2004), religious fanaticism (Pipes 2004), cognitive 
dissonance (Maikovich 2005), revenge for personal suffer-
ing (Margalit 2003), and despair (Prusher 2005).3
1 See figure 1. Data is derived from my database 
of incidents of suicide bombing. This database 
synthesizes information from online internet 
databases such as MIPT and ICT with general 
chronologies (Pape 2005; Pedahzur 2005) and 
LexisNexis searches.
2 This figure excludes 9/11.
3 For a general review of the psychological litera-
ture on terrorism, see Horgan (2005) and Victoroff 
(2005).
* Many thanks to Tobias Theiler, Indraneel Sircar, 
Matteo Fumagalli, Karen Jacques, and the two 
anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments 
on earlier drafts of this work. Research funded by 
the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and 
Social Sciences. 
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Studies on the organizational dimension of suicide bomb-
ing generally offer rational-choice explanations. Examples 
include cost-benefit analyses (Harrison 2001; Pape 2005), 
suicide bombing’s ability to balance power in an asymmet-
ric war (Gupta and Mundra 2005; Luft 2002), domestic 
political competition and outbidding by different organi-
zations for public support (Bloom 2005), and other strate-
gic motives such as the efficiency with which the terrorist 
can still activate the charge when captured (Ganor 2000).4
Studies on the societal dimension of terrorism and 
suicide bombing focus on factors such as the degree of 
political freedom and poverty in a given society (Abadie 
2004), frustration caused by social injustice (Bloom 2005; 
Khashan 2003; Merari 1990), and an attachment to politi-
cal Islam (Haddad 2004).5 Hafez (2006a) outlines that a 
sense of victimization and threat combined with sym-
bolic narratives that venerate martyrdom and legitimate 
leaders consenting to violence lead to societal support for 
suicide bombing.
These studies have all contributed to our knowledge of 
suicide bombing but the literature lacks a framework that 
ties all three dimensions together to explain the interac-
tion between them.6 Unidimensional explanations are 
unconcerned with the wider process that enables suicide 
bombing. Without incorporating other dimensions, the 
studies mentioned can often be misleading. Studies focus-
ing on the individual suicide bomber cannot explain or-
ganizational motivations and societal support. Organiza-
tional approaches concentrating on strategic and tactical 
advantages cannot explain how a culture of martyrdom is 
socially constructed. Societal approaches cannot take into 
account fully the complexity of individual and organiza-
tional processes. The point of this article is not to present 
new empirical data, but instead to synthesize the wealth 
of existing data into a broad conceptual framework.
Political and social psychology provide insights into 
behavior within groups, decision-making by individu-
als, political socialization, conformism, group conflict, 
and symbolic attachment. These insights underpin the 
reciprocal relationships outlined in figure 2. They occur 
unsystematically and can begin on any dimension. (A) 
depicts the observation that terrorist organizations are 
ultimately dependent on the social, political, financial, 
and moral patronage of the constituency they claim to 
represent. With this in mind, the terrorist organization 
must calibrate its tactics and the timing of its operations, 
and its leaders must wield material and/or non-material re-
sources to maximize societal support. (B) + (C) start with 
the proposition that when feelings of threat are salient, in-
dividuals are more likely to be submissive toward certain 
types of leaders and symbolic narratives. Aggressive poli-
cies ostensibly aimed against those who cause the threat 
and anxiety become more readily acceptable. (D) + (E) 
focus on how societal support coupled with catalysts and 
familial and friendship ties are behind the process of an 
individual joining a terrorist organization. (F) focuses on 
how the would-be-bomber radicalizes further through 
the internalization of relevant organizational norms.
Figure 2: Multi-dimensional model
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4 For a general literature review of the organiza-
tional dimension to terrorism, see Cronin 
(2003, 8–12).
5 For a general review on the societal literature, see 
Turk (2004).
6.  Hafez (2006b) and Moghadam (2006) have both 
put forward their own multi-causal frameworks 
but have not focused upon the interactions be-
tween dimensions. Pedahzur’s model (2004) does 
account for some interactions but is too systematic 
and fails to propose an interpretive lens through 
which these interactions can be explained.
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With slight alterations most of the processes described 
above for this model also have the potential to explain 
other (non-suicidal) acts of terrorism. However, in ex-
plaining suicide bombing this model contains three major 
differences from a model explaining ordinary terrorism. 
Firstly, the social construction of a “culture of martyr-
dom” is not necessary to explain non-suicidal terrorism. 
Secondly, as will be outlined later, in the Palestinian case, 
support for orthodox acts of terrorism remained more or 
less constant over the period examined whereas support 
for suicide bombing fluctuated. This fluctuation negatively 
correlated with optimism for the future. Therefore, a sense 
of threat correlates with support for suicide bombing. 
Perhaps, the surrounding political conditions are enough 
for support for orthodox acts of terrorism. Threat salience 
leads individuals toward escalatory tendencies in conflict 
and suicide bombing corresponds with this tendency for 
both normative and strategic reasons. Normatively, sui-
cide bombing violates almost every predominant ethical 
norm in societies in which it takes place (i.e. not to kill in-
nocents and not to commit suicide). Strategically, suicide 
bombing causes more casualties. Thirdly, the radicaliza-
tion process for a suicide bomber within the group setting 
is a longer and more intense one. Preparation to kill and 
be killed simultaneously requires a more nuanced psycho-
logical conditioning.
2. The Interactions Between Dimensions
2.1 The Terrorist Organization Seeks Societal Support by Creating a 
Culture of Martyrdom (A)
Prominent in terrorism studies is the argument that all 
terrorist acts are a rational strategic move vis-à-vis a more 
powerful opponent (Pape 2005, Crenshaw 1990). This is 
only partly correct. Terrorist acts are not only an attempt 
to communicate to the political elites and public opinion 
of the targeted state. Terrorist organizations also aim to 
communicate to the community they claim to represent 
(Hoffman and McCormick 2004). Taking this into con-
sideration, Weinburg and Pedahzur (2003) likened ter-
rorist organizations to political parties because they are 
both ultimately dependent upon the moral and economic 
patronage of their supporters. For example, Richardson 
(2006, 84) argues that the IRA was always mindful not to 
disaffect the Catholic population of Northern Ireland for 
fear of losing support. These concerns were reflected in 
its targeting strategies. Pape (2005) may be correct in 
asserting that suicide terrorism is a strategy to compel 
foreign occupiers to withdraw but he fails to recognize 
that this is just one part of the strategy. He fails to clarify 
that, as Tilly (2005, 11) points out, terror is a strategy that 
involves interactions among political actors at differ-
ent levels, “and that to explain the adoption of such a 
strategy we have no choice but to analyze it as part of a 
political process.” This section deals with how terrorist 
groups use their resources (both material and non-mate-
rial) to promote suicide bombing by creating a culture of 
martyrdom. In creating a culture of martyrdom, lead-
ers of terrorist organizations seek to generate support 
from their constituency of supporters. In the Palestinian, 
Tamil, Iraqi, Afghan and Chechen cases, this constitu-
ency is large and surrounds the organization itself. For al 
Qaeda and one-off cases such as 9/11, the Bali bombings, 
and the 7/7 bombings in London in 2005, the constitu-
ency mainly entails a “virtual constituency” consisting 
of global supporters on the internet and a small minority 
from within their own country holding similar sentiments. 
Resources utilized by terrorist organizations include; the 
use of propaganda, charismatic leaders, epistemic authori-
ties, agency-laden institutions, framing justifications, and 
using euphemistic language. I will now approach each of 
these resources in turn. The aim is to show that in spite 
of the heterogeneous political or religious motivations 
espoused by organizations using suicide bombing, the 
tactics used to garner support are very similar. 
2.1.1 Propaganda
Propaganda is one obvious method by which the terrorist 
organization seeks support. This includes; communiqués, 
media coverage depicting suicide bombers as martyrs, 
websites, public discourses, street posters, pamphlets, and 
attendance by respected public officials at the funerals 
or memorial ceremonies for suicide bombers. A full state 
funeral was held for a suicide bomber in Palestine in 2000. 
Tamil Tiger suicide bombers have orphanages named after 
them. A Palestinian suicide bomber had a youth football 
tournament held in his honor. Hamas calendars herald the 
“martyr of the month” (Hassan 2001). The Tamil Tigers, 
PKK, and Hezbollah commemorate the anniversary of 
their first suicide bombers each year. Chechens commem-
orate the first Chechen suicide bomber in a popular song. 
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Together, these acts produce an informal communication 
network that venerates suicide bombing. They supply the 
public with moral justifications for suicide attacks and 
help create a culture of martyrdom.
2.1.2 Leaders and Epistemic Authority Figures
Most terrorist organizations using suicide bombing pos-
sess either leaders revered by their followers or epistemic 
authority figures. Godlike leaders include Osama bin 
Laden of al Qaeda, Vellupillai Prabakharen of the Sri 
Lankan Tamil Tigers, Abdullah Ocalan of the PKK in 
Turkey, and al-Zarqawi in the Iraqi insurgency. Other 
groups rely on epistemic authorities in the construction 
of societal knowledge. Religious leaders are one example 
(Bar-Tal 2000, 65). For example, Hamas, Hezbollah, al 
Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, Iraqi and Afghanistan insurgents, 
and other suicide bombers such as those involved in 9/11 
and 7/7 rely on the religious rulings of Sheikh Ahmad 
Yassin, Sayid Muhammad Hasayn Fadlalla, Shaikh Yusuf 
Qardawi, and others to provide a legitimating ideology 
for suicide bombing.
2.1.3 Agency-Laden Institutions
Utilizing agency-laden institutions, defined as “cultural or 
organizational resources that can be mobilized to launch 
collective action” (Morris 2000, 450), is critical for a mass 
movement to be successful. Coupled with charismatic lead-
ership, these institutions provide fertile ground for the mo-
bilization of a mass movement. Leaders frame the necessity 
for, and means of, mobilization within these institutions. 
These institutions are often long-standing resources: 
Such institutions are configurations of cultural beliefs 
and practices that permeate and shape their social net-
works. Their cultural materials are constitutive in that 
they produce and solidify the trust, contacts, solidar-
ity, rituals, meaning systems, and options of members 
embedded in their social networks. Endemic to some 
agency-laden institutions is a transcendent and coher-
ent belief system that shape its actors’ moral and politi-
cal views about the kinds of relationships that ought to 
exist between individuals and social groups. These po-
litically relevant beliefs inspire … actions geared toward 
the realization of group interests. (Morris 2000, 447)
Some terrorist groups dominate such institutions and ex-
ert an informational influence to aid in political socializa-
tion. This is important in shaping behavioral compliance. 
Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Tamil Tigers capitalized on 
the lack of state structures to set up their own quasi-state 
systems. For example, Hamas founded hospitals and paid 
for funerals, medical care, dentistry, scholarships, pre-
natal care, and other social services. Hamas spokesman 
Ismail Abu Shanab explains the logic of this well: “The 
political level is the face of Hamas, but without the other 
divisions Hamas would not be as strong as it is now… . 
If nobody supports these needy families, maybe nobody 
would think of martyrdom and the resistance of the 
occupation” (cited in Bloom 2005, 27–8). Hamas leader 
Ibrahim al-Yazuri considered Hamas’s intention as “the 
liberation of all Palestine from the tyrannical Israeli oc-
cupation… . This is the main part of its concern … social 
work is carried out in support of this aim” (cited in Hu-
man Rights Watch 2002, 103–4). Other material resources 
include subsidies and apartments given to the families of 
suicide bombers (Human Rights Watch 2002, 16 and 100).
2.1.4 Public Discourse and Framing Justifications
Edelman (1971) argues that public discourse is central to 
evoking cognitive arousal and radicalization within the 
public. He explains behavior by focusing on what people 
expect of the future. Readily available evidence does not 
shape expectations. Instead, expectations based upon 
cues from legitimately perceived groups are absorbed 
more easily. This effect strengthens when cues include 
emotionally persuasive information and when they 
connect current events to a historical narrative (McDer-
mott 2004, 64–5; Della Porta and Diani 1999, 184). This 
is especially true in ambiguous situations. Actions by 
groups perceived as legitimate help to shape and create 
beliefs and norms, help create perceptions of what is true, 
and help shape expectations of the future. For example, 
Prabakharen, the leader of the Tamil Tigers, instrumen-
tally justified suicide bombing because “with persever-
ance and sacrifice, Tamil Eelam can be achieved in a 
hundred years. But if we conduct Black Tiger (suicide) 
operations, we can shorten the suffering of the people and 
achieve Tamil Eelam in a shorter period of time” (cited 
in Richardson 2006, 157). Without competing narratives 
from other sources, the cue effects strengthen further. In 
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these circumstances, they are a persuasive influence upon 
behaviour (Edelman 1971, 7).
Language is a key element in the construction of a legiti-
mating ideology or myth. “Language is capable not only 
of constructing symbols that are highly abstracted from 
everyday experience, but also of ‘bringing back’ these 
symbols and appresenting them as objectively real ele-
ments in everyday life. In this manner, symbolism and 
symbolic language become essential constituents of the 
reality of everyday life and of the commonsense appre-
hension of this reality” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 55). 
Terrorist groups consistently use euphemistic language 
when referring to suicide bombing. This portrays suicide 
bombing as heroic and deflects attention from the human 
suffering on both sides of the conflict. Prior to the attack, 
the would-be-bomber is a “living martyr” (al Shahid al 
hai). Afterwards, the funeral of the “martyr” is referred 
to as a “wedding.” In Palestinian Arabic, the phrase for 
a suicide bombing attack is an amaliyya istishadiyya, a 
“martyrdom operation,” or an amaliyya fida’iyya, a “sac-
rificial operation” (Human Rights Watch 2002, 36). The 
Tamil phrase for suicide bombing is thatkodai, meaning 
“to give yourself” (Richardson 2006; 140, Hopgood 2005, 
74). Those who have given themselves to the cause are 
mahaveera, meaning “brave one,” and their mother is 
veeravati or “brave mother” (Richardson 2006, 141).
Leaders of terrorist organizations and prominent politi-
cians frame justifications for suicide bombings in a number 
of ways. All attempt to cast the blame onto the other side 
or accentuate the success of the suicide bombing. Firstly, 
leaders frame suicide bombing as a response to state provo-
cation. Hamas labeled one set of bombings “the natural 
retaliation by a people slaughtered day and night, whose 
dignity is humiliated by the Zionist enemy’s war ma-
chine” (cited in Human Rights Watch 2002, 27–8). Hafez’s 
analysis of propaganda emanating from Iraqi insurgents 
(2007) details how they often present a problem (the 
United States), a cause of the problem (the subordination 
of existing Muslim regimes to the United States), and a 
solution (pious faith and martyrdom). Secondly, suicide 
bombing is framed as a tactic that balances power in what 
is an otherwise asymmetric war. Hamas spokesman ‘Abd 
al-‘Aziz al-Rantisi stated: “We don’t have F-16s, Apache 
helicopters and missiles… . They are attacking us with 
weapons against which we can’t defend ourselves. And now 
we have a weapon they can’t defend themselves against… . 
We believe this weapon creates a kind of balance, because 
this weapon is like an F-16” (Human Rights Watch 2002, 
56–7). Similarly, al-Zarqawi, leader of the Iraqi insurgency 
until his death, stated that his men “faced the strongest 
and most advanced army in modern times… . When the 
holy warriors noticed this huge disparity in numbers and 
armaments between them and the enemy, they looked for 
alternatives to amend this deficiency” (cited in Hafez 2007, 
98). Suicide bombing reduced the deficit. Thirdly, suicide 
bombing is framed as an act of national struggle. ‘Abd 
al-Rahman described suicide bombings to al-Jazeera as 
“the highest form of national struggle. There is no argu-
ment about that” (cited in Human Rights Watch 2002, 37). 
Fourthly, death under occupation is framed as inevitable 
anyway. Al-Rantisi also claimed that “to die in this way 
is better than to die daily in frustration and humiliation” 
(cited in Soibelman 2004, 180).
The examples provided show a remarkable similarity 
between organizations using suicide bombing in terms 
of leadership, how leaders frame justifications for sui-
cide bombing, and the use of propaganda, euphemistic 
language, and agency-laden institutions. Organizational 
leaders harness these non-material resources effectively in 
creating a culture of martyrdom. 
2.2 Societal Support for Bombers and Terrorist Organizations (B + C)
The previous section introduced means by which leaders 
of terrorist organizations seek societal support for suicide 
bombing. This section depicts the process whereby audi-
ences become susceptible to symbolic anxiety-reducing 
narratives and to the influence of leaders who promote 
the use of suicide bombing. I propose that key to account-
ing for this is the theory of terror management.
Greenberg et al. (1986, cited in Hogg and Vaughan 2005, 
138, and in Gordan and Arian 2001, 208) developed ter-
ror management theory. They argue that knowledge of 
the inevitability of death is the most fundamental threat 
that people face. Therefore, it is the most powerful mo-
tivating factor in human existence. Experimental stud-
ies strengthened the concept. When a sense of threat is 
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salient, positive feelings toward one’s belief system and 
those holding similar beliefs increase while negative feel-
ings toward those perceived to be a threat also increase. 
The strategy adopted to combat the threat is likely to be 
inflammatory (Castano et al. 2003, Voci 2006, Gordon 
and Arian 2001). Under conditions of threat decisions 
are based on emotion, but when feelings of threat are 
low decisions made are based on both logic and emotion. 
Therefore, when one is in a conflict situation, the course of 
action chosen is more likely to escalate and continue the 
conflict. Threat salience increases the likelihood of a reli-
ance on stereotypes to characterize the threatening out-
group (Schimel et al. 1999, Arndt et al. 2002). Importantly, 
Greenberg et al. (1990) and Lavine et al. (2002) found 
a positive correlation between threat salience and the 
likelihood of resorting to authoritarian modes of think-
ing. This may result in a search for an outgroup, thinking 
in black-and-white terms, and the need for strong leaders 
to lessen the anxiety produced by the situation (Montuori 
2005, 22–24). In other words, under conditions of threat, 
people are more likely to follow certain types of leaders 
espousing authoritarian values and symbolic narratives 
perceived to be legitimate and aggressive toward those 
who cause the threat and anxiety.
Sustained conflict brings a sense of threat to the fore. This 
impacts strongly upon the behavior of both individuals 
and collectives. Bar-Tal (2004) argues that in a conflict 
situation, individuals and collectives behave in particular 
ways. From an Israeli perspective, Bar-Tal (2004, 684–90) 
found that:
•  Individuals perceive information supplied by the 
ingroup’s epistemic authorities about the threatening 
outgroup as valid. 
•  Violence increases threat perception and feelings of 
fear and mistrust.
•  Violence and threat perceptions cause delegitimization 
of the rival group. 
•  Violence, threat perception, and fear increase support 
of violent means to cope with the rival.
•  During times of violence and perceived threat, people 
support a leader who projects forcefulness.
•  Violence, threat perception, and fear lead to group 
mobilization, patriotism, and unity, cause self-percep-
tion as a victim, increase internal pressure for confor-
mity and a readiness to impose sanctions on dissenting 
members of society.
The above points indicate that experiences of sustained 
conflict lead societies toward authoritarian mindsets.
Terror management theorists posit that individuals search 
for self-esteem through their social identity to counteract 
feelings of threat. Any act can increase positive ingroup 
status if members of the ingroup attach a positive role 
to the act itself (Rubin 2004, 825). Jerusalem Media and 
Communication Center (JMCC) and Palestinian Center 
for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) survey data show 
that many forms of violent action toward Israel have a 
positive value attached to them in Palestinian areas. 
They show strong support for military actions against the 
Israeli Defense Forces, Israeli civilians, and settlers in 
the West Bank and Gaza. Over the course of 16 surveys, 
undertaken between May 1997 and February 2006, JMCC 
survey data average 60.9 percent support for military 
operations against Israeli targets. The PCPSR findings 
average 88.1 percent support for any military operation 
against Israeli military targets over 13 surveys between 
August 1995 and March 2005. Support for armed attacks 
against Israeli civilians average 51.7 percent over nineteen 
surveys between August 1995 and June 2006 (PCPSR). 
Support for armed attacks against Israeli settlers in the 
West Bank and Gaza average 86.6 percent over twelve sur-
veys between August 1995 and December 2004 (PCPSR). 
Support for these acts was consistently higher amongst 
those who were educated, young, female, living in refugee 
camps, earning a higher income, and Hamas supporters.
 
As stated earlier, for al Qaeda, and one-off cases such as 
9/11, the Bali bombings, and 7/7, the constituency mainly 
entails a “virtual constituency” consisting of global sup-
porters on the internet and a small minority from within 
their own country holding similar sentiments. The work 
of Sageman (2005) and Hafez (2007) reveal the ubiquitous 
extent of propaganda for suicide bombing on the inter-
net. Opinion polls in many states reveal evidence of small 
minorities justifying suicide bombings. For example, ICM 
opinion polls undertaken for the British Guardian news-
paper reveal that in March 2004, 13 percent of Muslims 
150IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159Paul Gill: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing
polled in Britain were willing to justify future al Qaeda 
attacks on the United States while in July 2005, 5 percent 
of Muslims polled were willing to justify future attacks 
by British suicide bombers in the UK. Populus opinion 
polls undertaken for the British Times newspaper reveal 
that of the British Muslims polled in December 2005, 7 
percent were willing to justify suicide bombings in the 
UK, 16 percent in Israel, 13 percent in Chechnya, and 15 
percent in Iraq. A separate Populus opinion poll in June 
2006 showed 13 percent of polled British Muslims con-
sidered the 7/7 perpetrators to be martyrs. In the same 
poll 16 percent were willing to justify suicide bombings in 
the United Kingdom against military targets, 11 percent 
against government buildings/workers, 10 percent against 
the police, and 7 percent against civilians. A major Pew 
Research Center poll of sixty thousand Muslims living 
in the United States found that 5 percent justified suicide 
bombings. Of those aged under thirty, 15 percent saw jus-
tification. Pew’s “Global Attitudes Project” in May 2006 
asked “Can suicide bombing of civilian targets to defend 
Islam be justified?” Muslim respondents from states in 
which suicide bombers have emerged showed a small, 
but significant in its implications, minority who justify 
suicide bombing. Examples include Jordan (29 percent), 
Egypt (28 percent), Turkey (17 percent), Great Britain (15 
percent), Pakistan (14 percent), and Indonesia (10 percent).
Support for suicide bombings in the Palestinian regions is 
even higher. Over the course of nineteen surveys under-
taken between June 1995 and February 2006, JMCC sur-
vey data averaged 52 percent support for suicide bomb-
ings against any Israeli target. Support for specific suicide 
bombings in PCPSR surveys garnered even higher levels. 
The Maxim Restaurant bombing in 2003, which killed 
twenty Israeli civilians, received 74 percent support. The 
Beer Shiva suicide bombing in 2004 received 77 percent 
support, while 69 percent supported the suicide bombing 
in Tel Aviv in April 2006 that killed eleven civilians.
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Figure 3: Levels of support for suicide bombings versus optimism levels
Source: Collated JMCC survey data
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Support for orthodox (para)military operations against 
Israeli Defense Forces, Israeli settlers, and Israeli civilians 
remained more or less constant over the period examined. 
Support for suicide bombing, on the other hand, fluctu-
ated. JMCC survey data reveals a negative correlation be-
tween support for suicide bombing and optimism about 
the future (see figure 3). This finding corresponds with 
the terror management hypothesis that anxiety about the 
future turns individuals toward authoritarian and escala-
tory tendencies. Suicide bombings correspond with this 
escalatory tendency for both normative and strategic rea-
sons. Normatively, suicide bombing violates almost every 
predominant ethical norm in societies in which it takes 
place (i.e. not to kill innocents and not to commit suicide). 
Strategically, suicide bombing causes more casualties. 
Since the first Palestinian suicide bombing in April 1993, 
suicide bombing has accounted for 78 percent of Israeli 
deaths through terrorism despite its use in only 12 percent 
of incidents.7 Seventeen JMCC surveys included both of 
the following questions: “Are you optimistic or pessimis-
tic about the future?” and “Do you support suicide bomb-
ings?” When optimists outnumbered pessimists, support 
for suicide bombing averaged 40 percent. When optimists 
were in the minority, support averaged 65.6 percent.
To sum up, the variables listed in section (A) detailed how 
terrorist organizations seek to alter public opinion to elic-
it support. This section, on the other hand, proposed one 
major variable that stipulates the conditions under which 
audiences may become susceptible to these tactics. This 
is not to suggest however, that one psychological variable 
(sense of threat) by itself determines support. Instead, 
surrounding political conditions such as harsh anti-ter-
rorism policies, poverty, a sense of relative deprivation 
and/or the initiation of peace processes may also contrib-
ute toward individuals increasing or decreasing support 
for terrorist organizations or, at the very least, agreeing 
or disagreeing with their justifications. An example of 
surrounding political conditions lessening societal sup-
port for suicide bombing occurred in Palestine in Febru-
ary 2005. Journalists reported that the suicide bombing 
by Abdallah Badran was not celebrated. The surrounding 
community did not print posters of the new martyr. No 
social event was planned for his funeral. One local stated; 
“Things were getting better and then no sooner do we have 
money coming in again then it is stopped by this suicide 
bombing” (cited in Urquhart 2005). No suicide bombings 
emerged from Palestine in the following sixteen months. 
In other words, surrounding political conditions, coupled 
with a shared sense of threat (or lack thereof) can con-
tribute toward either increasing or decreasing support for 
suicide bombing.
2.3 The Individual Volunteers (D + E)
Studies focusing on motivations for joining terrorist 
organizations have evolved over the past three decades. 
Early research in the 1970s and 1980s searched for a “ter-
rorist personality.” This entailed the search for a deviant 
personality characteristic within some individuals using 
psychoanalytic theories. Essentially, the argument was 
that terrorist group members are born and not made by 
the surrounding social and political conditions and group 
processes. Studies of this nature usually contained no 
empirical data, neither primary nor secondary, and were 
often condemnatory in nature.
Academic work on terrorism improved in the 1990s. Em-
pirical work increased and there was a shift away from 
focusing on the terrorist as being deviant in nature. 
Group processes, the role of leaders, surrounding politi-
cal conditions and organizational motivations became 
incorporated into the literature. Despite this improve-
ment, research on individual motivations has been overly 
simplistic and deterministic. Typically, this work focuses 
upon a very small number of group members (if any at all) 
and extrapolates these findings onto the wider terrorist 
community. Various analyses have focused on pathologi-
cal disposition to violence (Gordon 2002, Post 1990), an 
authoritarian personality (Lester, Yang, and Lindsay 2004), 
general socialization factors (Atran, 2003, Post 2005, 
Sageman 2005), altruism (Azam 2005), rational choice 
(Gupta 2004), religious fanaticism (Pipes 2004), cognitive 
7 Mipt database of terrorism incidents 
(www.mipt.org).
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dissonance (Maikovich 2005), revenge for personal suffer-
ing (Margalit 2003), and despair (Prusher 2005). Although 
the above-mentioned studies have all contributed some-
what to our understanding of individual motivations, 
their generalizations are problematic. The diversity of 
demographic backgrounds of suicide bombers alone is 
striking. Bombers are between fifteen and seventy years 
old, overly educated and uneducated, male and female, 
from all socio-economic classes, Christian, Hindu, Sikh, 
and Muslim, religious and secular, single and married. 
These studies also only focus on the “supply side” and fail 
to account for the “demand side” of joining a terrorist 
organization. In other words, by focusing on the underly-
ing conditions that may create a large pool of potential 
recruits, they ignore the impediments to membership. 
Organizational leaders carefully choose who can join. 
This is essential due to the secretive nature of their work. 
The risk of any new recruit becoming a state informant 
or reneging on their task is too large. As will be outlined 
later, the role of familial and friendship ties is key to un-
derstanding how a person becomes a member. Motivation 
to become a suicide bomber should be viewed as a process 
(depicted in figure 4). The socialized individual is aware 
of potential increases in social status from membership of 
the organization. Although this awareness is usually long-
standing, it is only after the experience of a catalyst when 
compulsion to join becomes salient. Pre-existing familial 
and friendship ties mediate the recruitment process.
Despite the heterogeneity in the demographic back-
grounds of suicide bombers, all suicide bombers do share 
two common characteristics. One is membership in a 
terrorist organization. Never has a lone suicide bomber 
carried out an operation in a bout of heavenly revelation 
or vengeance. Instead, all suicide attacks are coordinated, 
designed, premeditated and organized by a terrorist or-
ganization. Kimhi and Even’s typology of suicide bomb-
ers (2004) illustrates the second common characteristic. 
They operationalized sixty Palestinian bombers into four 
categories: religious, exploited, retribution for suffering, 
and social/nationalist. Support of the community that 
reveres martyrdom was a supportive factor in each ideal 
type. It was the only common factor included in all four 
ideal types. By acknowledging the important role a “cul-
ture of martyrdom” plays, they strengthen the argument 
that it is the surrounding social environment rather than 
a personality flaw that compels people to join terrorist 
organizations.
The influences mentioned in connection with interac-
tions A, B, and C also affect the would-be-bomber. The 
role of propaganda, proclamations supporting suicide 
bombing from leaders perceived to be legitimate, and a 
sense of threat because of the ongoing conflict may cre-
ate a pool of willing recruits for terrorist organizations. 
Propaganda that makes a celebrity of the suicide bomber 
may play a large role in helping others to make the same 
decision. Range et al (1997) provide persuasive sociologi-
cal evidence that “suicidal contagion” exists following an 
extensively publicised celebrity suicide. Other factors may 
also play a role and are outlined below.
Through interviews with terrorists, Silke (2003) describes 
the process of becoming a terrorist as primarily an issue 
of socialization. Fields (1978) came to a similar conclu-
sion. Her eight-year longitudinal study found exposure to 
terrorism as a child produces a tendency toward terrorism 
as an adult. Bloom (2005, 1) points out that suicide bomb-
ing campaigns usually occur in the second iteration of 
violence, citing examples such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, 
Chechnya, and Sri Lanka. When socialized into a society 
where violence is a regular, highly publicized, and visible 
experience, one may start to think of violence as a normal 
part of everyday life. Post et al’s interviews with captured 
terrorists (2005) reveal awareness of the potential of 
increased social status as a prime motivator in joining a 
terrorist organization.
Silke (2003) also outlines that catalysts usually precipi-
tate the compulsion to join a terrorist group. This is very 
true for would-be suicide bombers. The catalyst could be 
a response to personal suffering,8 revenge for imprison-
8  Wafaa Nour E’Din (23), female. Carried out 
bombing for Hezbollah on May 9, 1985. 
Her husband had been killed in conflict by the IDF 
earlier that year.
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ment,9 a recent conversion to Islam,10 an act of violence by 
opposition forces,11 a response to restrictions on move-
ment12, a response to personal desperation,13 or frustra-
tion of personal goals.14 The list of catalysts and examples 
of bombers are endless. 
Empirical studies of recruitment processes in terrorist 
organizations highlight the important role of pre-existing 
familial or friendship ties. Familial ties aid recruitment 
in the IRA (Toolis 1995), and the recruitment of female 
ETA members (Reinares 2004). Friendship ties are impor-
tant for enrolling Italian and German left-wing militants 
(Della Porta 1992). Mixtures of both are important to the 
recruitment process of Palestinian groups (Post et al. 2005), 
global jihadists (Sageman 2005), and Colombian groups 
(Florez-Morris 2007). Plenty of evidence exists to show 
the importance of pre-existing familial and friendship 
ties in recruiting would-be-suicide bombers Examples 
include husband and wife teams of bombers in Palestine, 
Chechnya, Iraq, and Jordan, a father and daughter team 
in Chechnya in November 2002, two Chechen sisters in 
August 2004, a sister of a top aide to al-Zarqawi in Jordan 
in November 2005, a sister of a deceased Islamic Jihad 
militant in October 2003, a sister of an imprisoned Fatah 
operative in May 2003, a nephew of a prominent leader of 
Hamas in March 2001, and a nephew of a prominent Fatah 
leader in May 2005. Of the twenty-one Chechen suicide 
bombers I have identified, fourteen had direct family 
members taking part in the conflict. Of the 220 Palestinian 
suicide bombers I have identified, there is clear evidence 
of pre-existing familial and friendship ties within the 
organization in 56 of the cases. Among the 9/11 hijackers 
there were many pre-existing friendship ties, two sets of 
brothers, and three hijackers who shared tribal affiliations. 
One would-be-bomber in the Iraqi insurgency claimed he 
had fifteen friends who had become suicide bombers them-
selves (Ghosh 2005). Examples of best friends carrying out 
double suicide bombings include Palestine in December 
2001, January 2003, September 2003, March 2004, and 
Chechnya in August 2004. Seven members of the same 
Palestinian football club carried out a wave of suicide at-
tacks in late 2002, early 2003 (Hammer and Zidan 2003). 
2.4 The Individual Radicalizes Within a Group Setting (F)
Munir al-Makdah, a trainer of suicide bombers, out-
lines, “much of the work is already done by the suffering 
these people have been subject to… . Only 10 percent 
comes from me. The suffering and living away from their 
land has given the person 90 percent of what he needs to 
Socialization processes,
community support,
other environmental factors
Catalyst
Suicide bomber
Pre-existing ties 
to aid recruitment
9 Yusef Ali Mohammed Zughayer (22) and Sulei-
man Musa Dahayneh (24) both served time in 
Israeli prisons. They conducted a double suicide 
bombing on November 6, 1998, in Jerusalem.
10 Sergey Dimitriyev, former Russian soldier, 
who converted to Islam and conducted a suicide 
truck bombing on June 11, 2000, for the Chechen 
separatist movement.
11 Taysir Ahmed Ajrami (22) carried out a suicide 
bombing on the November 26, 2001.The bomber‘s 
suicide note said the attack was in response to the 
killing of five Palestinian children the previous 
week by an Israeli mine.
12 Abdel-Basset Odeh (25), carried out bombing 
on March 27, 2002. Restrictions on movement pre-
vented him from seeing his fiancée in Baghdad.
13 Ala Araeshi (17) was a victim of AIDS. He tar-
geted Israeli police using a belt bomb.
14 Three bombers carried out three separate acts 
over the course of one weekend in Israel. All three 
had attended Hebron Polytechnic University, 
which had been closed by IDF forces months 
beforehand.
Figure 4: The path to becoming a suicide bomber
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become a martyr. All we do is provide guidance and help 
strengthen his faith and help set the objectives for him” 
(cited in Davis 2003, 154). This section deals with the extra 
10 percent that al-Makdah refers to. Upon joining the 
group, what behavioral and psychological characteristics 
of the individual alter?
Social identity theory (SIT) explains how individuals 
define themselves by their social group memberships. SIT 
accounts for two dual processes: social comparison and 
categorization. Both processes have their own underlying 
motivations – to feel positive about oneself and to reduce 
the complexity of the surrounding world (Hogg and Grieve 
1999, 81). Self-perception of group membership creates psy-
chologically distinguishing effects. From a SIT perspective, 
groups vie to be different from one another in positive 
ways because this provides individual group members 
with positive social identities (Hogg and Vaughan 2005, 
410). The improvement of self-esteem in the group setting 
strengthens the individual’s group identification.
Stereotyping within the group creates a group prototype 
that specifies the mindsets, sentiments, perceptions, 
norms, and codes of conduct that characterize the group. 
The stereotype aids in the social categorization process 
whereby the individual assimilates others into relevant 
in- and outgroups. This depersonalizes the self, fellow 
ingroup members, and outgroup members because they 
are all viewed no longer as idiosyncratic individuals but 
as members of groups. The individual stereotypes the 
ingroup as homogenous and coherent. This accentuates 
the similarities of ingroup members while simultaneously 
accentuating the differences between ingroup and out-
group members. This also increases subjective certainty 
and “renders existence meaningful and thus gives one 
confidence in how to behave, and what to expect from the 
physical and social environment within which one finds 
oneself” (Hogg and Grieve 1999, 81). Trust, mutual aid 
and compassion extend to fellow ingroup members but 
not to those in the outgroup.
Group norms deepen group bonds by increasing group 
solidarity and aiding the internalization of a group identity. 
When this occurs, the individual views the newly acquired 
norms as normal and therefore legitimate. The effects 
strengthen if this “sub-universe” of thought and knowl-
edge contains influential leaders. One obvious example is 
the influence of religious figures. These leaders may replace 
significant others who played a role in the individual’s pri-
mary socialization. In other words, “the socializing person-
nel take on the character of significant other vis-à-vis the 
individual being socialized” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 
165). Significant others and group norm acquisition ulti-
mately facilitate the suicide bomber throughout his train-
ing, the final process of which is acquiring the willingness 
to sacrifice oneself for the beliefs and norms internalized. 
Group norms include coping strategies for the terrorist to 
insulate himself from the human suffering of his actions. 
Bandura (1990) outlines four commonly used strategies. 
Firstly, they may imagine themselves as saviors. “The Israe-
lis, the enemy itself, they are the ones who caused me to do 
what I did” argues a failed suicide bomber in an interview. 
(Schechter 2004). Secondly, they displace responsibility 
onto the leader or other members. Thirdly, they minimize 
or ignore actual suffering. “I do not accept responsibi-
lity for their deaths. I feel pain, of course. They are little 
children. But the government of Israel is solely responsible” 
a captured bomb-maker stated (Schechter 2004). Finally, 
they dehumanize their victims. Palestinian propaganda is 
full of imagery of Israelis depicted as pigs, dogs, monkeys, 
and donkeys (Oliver and Steinberg 2005, 101–2).
Group identity overrides individual identity upon the ac-
quisition of group norms. This leads to a tendency toward 
group polarization, defined as a propensity for groups “to 
make decisions that are more extreme than the mean of 
individual members’ initial positions, in the direction al-
ready favored by that mean. So, for example, group discus-
sion among a collection of people who already favor capital 
punishment is likely to produce a group decision that 
strongly favors capital punishment” (Hogg and Vaughan 
2005, 342). With group identity overriding individual iden-
tity, the group, if highly cohesive, will tend toward a state 
of mind known as groupthink. Hogg and Vaughan (2005, 
340) list the antecedents of groupthink as being:
•  Excessive group cohesiveness
•  Insulation of group from external information and 
influence
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•  Lack of impartial leadership and of norms encouraging 
proper procedures
•  High stress from external threat and task complexity
They also list the symptoms of these antecedents as;
•  Feelings of invulnerability and unanimity
•  Unquestioning belief that the group must be right
•  Tendency to ignore or discredit information contrary 
to the group’s position
•  Direct pressure exerted on dissidents to bring them 
into line
•  Stereotyping of outgroup members
The antecedents and their symptoms (which have all been 
discussed in this paper) show how a commonly held group 
identity can radicalize the individual group members to-
ward a state of mind that they may not reach independent 
of a group setting. In terms of suicide bombing, terrorist 
cells “canalize disparate religious or political sentiments 
of individuals into an emotionally bonded group of fictive 
kin who willfully commit to die spectacularly for one 
another” (Atran 2003, 1534). Suicide bombing, in this light, 
is a form of Durkheim’s (1953) concept of altruistic suicide 
whereby, due to the deep integration of the individual in 
the group, the suicide is carried out for the group rather 
than for the individual himself.
Social psychologists argue that conformity is a big factor 
in explaining behavior in a group setting. Conformity to 
group norms is a less direct manner of social influence 
than Milgram’s famous experiments (1974). Conformity to 
an authoritative figure does not explain the behaviour but 
“the subjective validity of social norms; that is, a feeling 
of confidence and certainty that the beliefs and actions 
described by the norm are correct, appropriate, valid and 
socially desirable” (Hogg and Vaughan 2005, 245). Leaders 
of terrorist organizations ensure norm conformity until 
moments before the suicide bombing. Fellow terrorist 
group members closely guard the bomber. This facilitates 
suicide bombing by guarding against the bomber reneging. 
In Palestine, if the would-be-bomber does show signs of 
weakness, a senior trainer will be called for to reinforce his 
determination (Hassan 2001). Eyewitness reports of suicide 
bombings in Israel consistently include the description of 
three or four men dropping the bomber off at his destina-
tion. Other organizations use multiple bombers at the 
same time to build more pressure to conform. Al Qaeda, 
the Tamil Tigers, and the Chechen and Iraqi insurgents 
regularly use more than one bomber. Iraqi and Palestin-
ian suicide bombers are constantly subjected to videos of 
past suicide bombings in the days before their operation 
(Hassan 2001, Ghosh 2005). Would-be bombers write and 
record their last wills and testaments, the effect of which 
may create a point of no return. The charismatic leader 
of the Tamil Tigers, Pirabhakaran, has a final meal with 
would-be bombers the night before their operation. On 
one occasion, Anita Pratap, an Indian journalist was pres-
ent. She described the would-be bombers as “utterly emo-
tionless … they could have been lobotomized for all I knew 
… the only time they showed some emotion was when they 
talked about Pirabhakaran” (Pratap 2001, 102–104). 
Some Palestinian areas frequently produce bombers in 
intermittent phases. This may be because the bombers are 
trained and socialized into the group together, and are set 
down a path dependent process whereby the first bomb-
ing produces a pressure on the next in line to become a 
bomber. There are many examples of this. Three university 
students from Hebron all carried out separate attacks in 
Israel over the course of three days in May 2003. A fourth 
Hebron resident followed four weeks later. Twelve suicide 
bombers came from Nablus between December 2, 2001, 
and March 30, 2002. No Nablus residents carried out a 
suicide bombing in the following five weeks. Ten suicide 
bombers broke this phase between May 7 and August 
6. Again, no bombers emerged from Nablus for another 
two months before four more carried out their operations 
between October 27, 2002, and January 5, 2003. What is 
striking is that when no bombers emerged from Nablus, 
plenty came from Jenin. For example, between 25 May, 
2001, and 12 August, 2001, there were seven Jenin suicide 
bombers. No Jenin bombers materialized for almost two 
months. Between October 7, 2001, and December 9, 2001, 
three Jenin residents blew themselves up. No Jenin bomb-
ers emerged until March 5, 2002, and there was a further 
five before June 5. Again, there was a two-month spell with 
no Jenin suicide bombers but four bombers followed in the 
space of two months between August 4 and October 21. 
Of the eighteen months covered here, there is only eight 
weeks of overlap between the two towns producing suicide 
bombers. This pattern of intermittent phases also occurs in 
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Bethlehem, Hebron, Tulkarem and Kalkilya. The same may 
also be true of bombers within the Iraqi and Afghanistan 
insurgencies but data is too sparse at this moment in time.
This pattern of intermittent phases may be reinforced by 
domestic competition factors between Palestinian factions. 
Palestinian terrorist organizations are not as hierarchi-
cally structured as, for example, the IRA, or ETA. Because 
of the restrictions on movement and communication, and 
the targeted assassination of their leaders, these organiza-
tions rely on a high degree of autonomy of local leaders and 
activists (Pedahzur and Perliger 2006). A Hamas suicide 
bombing by their Nablus cell, for example, would create 
a pressure on the rival Nablus cells of Fatah, Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad and the PFLP to carry out a similar operation 
for fear of losing local support. This finding coupled with 
Pedahzur and Perliger’s social network analysis of Palestin-
ian terrorist organizations (2006) supports Bloom’s thesis 
(2005) of domestic political competition factors driving sui-
cide bombings except at a local rather than national level.
3. Conclusion
This paper has proposed a theoretical prism to view sui-
cide bombing by incorporating the interactions between 
the suicide bomber, the terrorist organization and the sur-
rounding society from which suicide bombing emerges. By 
synthesizing empirically rich unidimensional approaches, 
this multi-dimensional model provides us with a broader 
understanding of suicide bombing. Leaders of terrorist 
organizations use material and nonmaterial resources to 
venerate suicide bombing. Resources include the use of 
charismatic leaders, epistemic authority figures, agency-
laden institutions, framing justifications, euphemistic 
language, and monetary rewards. Under conditions of 
threat, societies accept the proclamations of authoritarian 
charismatic leaders as authentic and resort to authoritar-
ian mindsets. Threat salience coupled with, and caused 
by, surrounding political conditions facilitate support for 
suicide bombing. The individual, in search of a positive 
identity, joins the terrorist organization with the support 
of a surrounding community. Experiencing catalysts and 
recruitment through pre-existing familial and friendship 
ties drive the process of becoming a suicide bomber for-
ward. Within the group, the new recruit radicalizes further. 
Relevant norm internalization, group polarization, group 
conformity, group identity overriding individual identity, 
the use of multiple bombers and other techniques are used 
by group leaders to facilitate the individual becoming a 
suicide bomber.
This model is stronger than others in the current field of 
research for many reasons. By focusing on organizational 
and individual motivations as two distinct processes, the 
models proposed by Moghadam (2006) and Hafez (2006) 
ignore why and how leaders of terrorist organizations so-
cially construct a “culture of martyrdom” and under what 
conditions audiences become susceptible to such narratives. 
The radicalization process of the would-be-bomber within 
the group setting is also largely ignored. Insights from so-
cial and political psychology provide an effective interpre-
tive lens to understand these symbiotic processes. By his 
own admission, Pedahzur’s model (2004) is too systematic. 
Various interactions have shown dissimilar causal weights 
in each case of a terrorist organization resorting to suicide 
bombing. Elites within Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad resorted to suicide bombing after carefully 
crafting a “culture of martyrdom.” The Tamil Tigers spent 
three years radicalizing and training cadres to become sui-
cide bombers. This followed the apparent accidental suicide 
bombing of Captain Miller in 1987, which LTTE supporters 
celebrated as the highest form of martyrdom. In this case, 
grass roots support for suicide bombing preceded the social 
construction of a “culture of martyrdom” and the train-
ing of members. When these conditions converged from 
1990 onwards, the LTTE became the most prolific users of 
suicide bombing until the Iraqi insurgency began. Fatah’s 
Table 1: Bombers from Nablus and Jenin, May 25, 2001 — January 5, 2003
Dates Town No. of bombers
May 25 — July 22, 2001 Jenin 5
August 2 — 8, 2001 Nablus 2
August 9 — 12, 2001 Jenin 2
October 7 — December 9, 2001 Jenin 3
December 2, 2001 — March 30, 2002 Nablus 12
March 5 — June 5, 2002 Jenin 6
May 7 — August 8, 2002 Nablus 10
August 4 — October 21, 2002 Jenin 4
October 27, 2002 — January 5, 2003 Nablus 4
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declining support in the Palestinian regions led them to 
undertake suicide bombing campaigns to boost support. 
Lower-level members of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) 
resorted to suicide bombing following the imprisonment 
of their leader in Turkey. Self-starter suicide bombers such 
as the London bombers make their own decisions but 
are heavily motivated by pre-existing calls to arms by al 
Qaeda leaders, “virtual” supporters, and ultimately group 
radicalization. 
Focusing on organizations that have not resorted to 
suicide bombing also confirms this model. Kalyvas and 
Sánchez-Cuenca (2005, 211) provide details of Colombian 
terrorist organization FARC’s attempt to recruit suicide 
bombers. Despite offering a $2 million reward to the 
families of potential bombers, FARC was unsuccessful. 
The model outlined in this paper provides two reasons for 
this failure. Firstly, FARC does not possess charismatic 
leaders or epistemic authority figures, nor does it control 
social institutions. This makes it impossible to success-
fully create a “culture of martyrdom” to garner support 
for suicide bombing from the wider community. Secondly, 
offering substantial amounts of money does not overcome 
the unwillingness of potential recruits to become suicide 
bombers. Without a “culture of martyrdom” and support 
for suicide bombing amongst their constituency of sup-
porters, FARC found it impossible to radicalize recruits 
to the point of becoming a suicide bomber. ETA never re-
sorted to suicide bombing, also for these reasons. A further 
reason may explain the IRA’s unwillingness to use suicide 
bombing despite possessing a historical narrative of mar-
tyrdom to rely upon. Kalyvas and Sánchez Cuenca (2005) 
provide examples of how the IRA marginalized them-
selves within their community after indiscriminate acts 
of violence. Suicide bombing causes more deaths than any 
other terrorist method. Possessing this knowledge through 
social learning, the IRA knew it could not afford the costs 
of losing more support. The examples, provided by Kaly-
vas and Sánchez Cuenca, also suggest that ETA’s and the 
IRA’s supporters were considerably more moderate than 
the members of the organizations themselves. The IRA 
perhaps were also mindful not to disaffect their American 
support base. Utilizing a tactic originally developed to kill 
American forces in Lebanon might have isolated the IRA 
from their lucrative fundraising contacts in America.
Further research will be required to refine the model. Is 
there a relationship between acts of suicide bombing and 
counter-terrorism techniques such as targeted assassina-
tions and incursions? Is there an association between so-
cietal support for suicide bombing and counter-terrorism 
techniques? In what way do some counter-terrorism tech-
niques influence the target society? Interviews with failed 
suicide bombers may further our knowledge of the group 
radicalization process while more detailed case studies of 
individual terrorist organizations and campaigns would 
allow for a comparative approach to this model.
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